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Abstract 
Using unique survey data which includes information on precautionary wealth and its 
target, we analyze the precautionary saving behavior of Japanese households.  Our 
findings are: 1. Measures for income uncertainty have a positive influence on the target for 
precautionary wealth but not on precautionary wealth. 2. The positive influence of income 
uncertainty on the target vanishes when older households with a head aged 51 or older are 
included in the sample.  These findings suggest that Japanese households save against 
income uncertainty until around when their head is aged 50 and then save against other 
risks such as the longevity risk.   
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1. Introduction 
    We are exposed to various sources of risks in our economic life.  Among them 
income uncertainty is the risk that most affects an individual’s welfare through its influence 
on consumption.  For an average family, the labor incomes of employed family members 
are the largest part of the household income as returns on financial assets and other 
non-labor incomes such as earnings from rented lands and homes are negligible.  Hence, 
unexpected adverse shocks to labor incomes of working family members can have 
devastating impacts on the household’s subsistence. 
How do households cope with labor income risks?  Apart from partial coverage of 
unemployment risks by public unemployment benefits, insurances, public or private, do not 
generally protect households from such labor income risks of salaried workers as pay and 
bonus cuts.  Insurances aimed at volatile sales of the self-employed are almost 
nonexistent. 
An individual (or a household) may self-insure against unanticipated adverse events in 
the future.  Buffering motives for savings against future uncertainties are summarized as a 
precautionary motive for saving and are distinguished from savings for specified 
expenditures at various life stages such as purchasing durable goods, funding her children’s 
schooling, a down payment for a home purchase, and the individual’s living expenses after 
her retirement,. 
In the following analysis, we run a regression of the precautionary wealth reported by 
the survey respondents on measures for household labor income uncertainties.  If 
individuals save not only for specified future expenditures but also against uncertainties, 
individuals with a greater risk exposure should compress consumption and accumulates 
wealth more than those with a smaller risk exposure. 
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A measure for income uncertainty should be more strongly (positively) correlated to 
self-reported precautionary wealth than (positively) to total household wealth or 
(negatively) to consumption.  Individuals who face imminent income uncertainty not only 
reduce present consumption but may also give up some future consumption and reduce 
current savings for specified future expenditures.  If such reallocation of savings is widely 
practiced, higher risk exposures do not affect total wealth and present consumption as much 
as the self-reported precautionary wealth. 
We also use the target for precautionary wealth reported by survey respondents as 
another dependent variable.  According to the buffer stock saving hypothesis proposed by 
Carroll (1992, 1997), an individual saves primarily against her risk exposure when she is 
young and less aware of her retirement.  Carroll derives that a consumer engaged in a 
dynamic saving/consumption decision has her own target as a buffer against her risk 
exposure.  The target for precautionary wealth depends on the consumer’s preference and 
her risk exposure.  Use of the self-reported target serves as a direct empirical test of the 
Carroll’s hypothesis.  Recently, Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) emphasized the importance 
using the self-reported wealth targets collected in the Survey of Consumer Finances in 
testing the precautionary saving hypothesis. 
We group households into distinct homogeneous groups according to household 
occupational and demographic characteristics and calculate a measure for household labor 
income uncertainty as in Dardanoni (1991) and Zhou (2003).  For instance, the business 
income of a self-employed is less stable than the salary of a worker of a large company 
under a longer-term contract.  Such heterogeneity of income uncertainty across individuals 
is captured by varied risk exposures across groups of similar households.  The logarithm 
of household labor income, the measure used in our analysis turns out to be empirically 
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more plausible than the variance used by Dardanoni (1991) and Zhou (2003).  When 
running regressions instrumental variables are used in order to remove a potentially serious 
simultaneity bias caused by a household’s occupational choice. 
A dummy variable indicating whether a household head is healthy or unhealthy is 
employed as an additional measure for income uncertainty.  This variable is meant to 
capture the risk that a household head will go through a substantial period without labor 
income due to a sick leave or a job loss caused by deteriorated health conditions. 
The data we use are taken from the Survey on the Financial Asset Choice of 
Households (SFACH) conducted by the Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy 
(IPTP) of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of the Government of Japan (the 
present Japan Post Corporation).   
What makes the SFACH unique is the survey on the household’s current financial 
wealth and the household’s wealth target for at least twelve saving motives in addition to 
the survey on total financial assets, borrowing, and various financial and demographic 
variables.  Among twelve motives surveyed, “for peace of mind but not for specific 
reasons” best represents the saving for unanticipated income fluctuations.  Another 
surveyed motive, “for illness, natural disasters, and other unexpected expenditures”, 
captures the precautionary saving motive for uninsured and unanticipated expenses.  The 
precautionary saving motive for uninsured unanticipated expenses is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 1   
Our main findings are: 1. Measures for income uncertainty have a positive influence 
on the self-reported target for precautionary wealth but not on precautionary wealth itself in 
younger households. 2. The positive influence of income uncertainty on the self-reported 
                                                  
1 For an empirical analysis of this type of precautionary saving, see Palumbo (1999). 
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target for precautionary wealth vanishes for the sample including older households with a 
head aged 51 or older.  These findings suggest that Japanese households save against 
income uncertainty until around when their head is aged 50 and then save against other 
risks such as the longevity risk afterward.   
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, the relevant literature is reviewed.  
In section 3, the data and econometric issues are examined.  In section 4, the empirical 
results are reported.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
We will review the literature on precautionary saving in this section.2 
Carroll (1992, 1997) formally modeled the individual’s precautionary saving behavior.  
Assuming the forward looking individual’s maximization of the more realistic utility 
function than the one assumed by the stripped-down life cycle model, he claimed that an 
ordinary individual starts to save for her retirement only in her early 50’s and that she saves 
primarily for income uncertainty in the near future until then.  In her youth when her 
saving motive is precautionary against uncertainties, the individual saves only as much as 
her target derived from her risk exposure and preference, which serves as a buffer against 
adverse realizations of her risk exposure.  Carroll’s buffer stock saving hypothesis 
successfully explains the stylized fact that consumption tracks income in the individual’s 
earlier life.  This had remained a puzzle under the stripped-down life cycle hypothesis 
according to which consumption is smoothed out over the individual’s life and is 
independent of the concurrent level of income. 
Results of empirical tests on the precautionary saving hypothesis are mixed.  The 
                                                  
2 See Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Murata (2003) for a more detailed literature review of the 
empirical research on precautionary saving. 
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typical regression equation testing the hypothesis has consumption, flow saving, or wealth 
as a dependent variable and some income risk measure as an independent variable.  
Precautionary saving motive is said to exist if, controlling for demographic characteristics 
and life cycle saving for retirement, the employed income risk measure is negatively related 
to consumption, positively to saving, and positively to wealth. 
    There have been plenty of empirical works on precautionary saving motives using data 
from the US and Europe where micro household level survey data have been publicly 
available.  Different variables are used as a measure for income risk.  Such income risk 
measures used in the literature include occupation (Skinner [1988]), some measure for a 
labor income risk such as a variance (Carroll [1994], Carroll and Samwick [1997, 1998]), 
some measure for a risk of consumption growth (Dynan [1993]), an estimated probability 
of job loss (Carroll, Dynan and Krane [2003]) and some subjective measure of income risks 
reported by a survey respondent (Lusardi [1998]). 
On the other hand, it is only recently that empirical investigation on precautionary 
saving began with the Japanese micro household level data.  With the 1994 wave of the 
SFACH, Horioka and Watanabe (1997) find that 14 percent of the gross household flow of 
savings in financial assets is for a “peace of mind” motive.  Using the 1996 wave of the 
same survey, Zhou (2003) group households in more homogeneous subgroups of 
households based on the household head’s age group, occupation, and educational 
attainment.  She then calculates the group variances of household labor income, and find 
that household consumption is lower for those who belong to a group with a higher group 
variance of labor income.  Murata (2003) uses the yearly panel of the Japanese Panel 
Survey of Consumers from 1993 through 1998, and shows that a subjective measure for 
income uncertainty based on the respondent’s self-report does not account for their 
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financial wealth. 
Studies on household level data from the US, Europe and Japan differ considerably in 
the importance of the precautionary saving motive to insure against income uncertainty.  
Some studies find a statistically significant coefficient on an employed income risk measure 
and others do not. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
3.1. Data 
    The Survey on the Financial Asset Choice of Households has been conducted every 
two years since 1988.  The most recent 9th wave of the SFACH was conducted in 2004.  
The sample of households of each wave is selected through a two-stage stratified sampling 
method.  In conducting the survey, interviewers visit the selected sample households and 
asked them to fill out the questionnaire, and several days later, interviewers revisit them 
and collect the questionnaire.  Similar questions were asked repeatedly but they were not 
necessarily identical across waves. 
    In this paper, the data from four waves of the SFACH, the 1994 wave (the fourth 
wave), the 1996 wave (the fifth wave), the 1998 wave (the sixth wave), and the 2000 wave 
(the seventh wave) are pooled and analyzed.  For every wave used in our study, 6000 
households including single-person households were surveyed and the response rate was 
over 60 percent (65.4% in 1994, 61.6% in 1996, 62.6% in 1998 and 62.1% in 2000).  
Every wave but the 2000 wave was conducted between the late November and the early 
December of the survey year, and the remaining 2000 wave was conducted between the late 
January and the early February of 2001.3   
                                                  
3 Examining the 1994 wave, Horioka and Watanabe (1997) ensure reliability of the SFACH, based on its 
comparison with the Family Saving Survey, the most widely used saving survey in Japan. 
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    In constructing the pooled data set of four waves of the SFACH, households with a 
head aged 29 or younger or households with a head aged 60 or older are dropped so that the 
study focuses on households whose head is of a working age.4  Single-person households 
are dropped since they are underrepresented in the SFACH.  Households whose before-tax 
non-capital income is zero or missing are dropped.5, 6  In addition, households with a 
female head, a head who is not working, who is working part-time, and who is a student, 
are dropped.7 
    Dropping further households whose relevant demographic information such as the 
number of children and the age of the household head, the constructed sample pooling four 
waves of the SFACH includes 3903 households. 
 
3.2. Estimation of labor income uncertainty 
    In this study, following Dardanoni (1991) and Zhou (2003), the measure for household 
                                                  
4 The primary age of retirement in Japan is 60.  Households with a head in her 20’s are dropped since 
many such households are yet to enter the workforce. 
5 We use after-tax income for our analysis, since data on before-tax income are not available for 1998 
and 2000 waves of the SFACH. 
6 In the earlier two waves (1994 and 1996 waves), the survey collects information on whether individual 
household members such as a household head and his spouse have any capital income and if so how 
much.  In the later two waves (1998 and 2000 waves), the survey collects information on whether an 
entire household has any capital income and if so how much.  In calculating non-capital income, if 
households answer that they have capital income but do not answer the amount of capital income, we 
regard their capital income to be zero.  Such way of processing the data is less likely to lead to 
underestimation of capital income because 1) only a fraction of households say they have capital income 
but do not report the amount of capital income (13 percent of household heads in 1994, 24 percent of 
household heads in 1996, 15 percent of households in 1998, and 7 percent of households in 2000), and 2) 
those who say they have capital income but who do not report the amount of capital income are likely to 
have little capital income compared to those who report the amount of capital income. 
7 There are very few households with a female head in the SFACH data. 
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labor income uncertainty is calculated for each group of homogeneous households sharing 
the same demographic characteristics.  More precisely, following the grouping of 
households employed by Zhou (2003) in spirit but improving on it, the sample is grouped 
by the age group, cohort, occupation, and educational attainment of the household head. 
Each age group and cohort considered have a 10 year window based on a household 
head’s age and his cohort: i.e., 30’s, 40’s, 50’s for age groups, and those born in the period 
from 1931 to 1940, in the period from 1941 to 1950, in the period from 1951 to 1960, and 
in the period from 1961 to 1970.  Occupations considered are employment in a private 
entity that employs less than 30 persons, employment in a private entity that employs 30 or 
more but less than 500 persons, employment in a private entity that employs 500 persons or 
more, public service, and self-employment that includes farming, forestry, and fishery.  
Educational attainments considered are junior high school, high school, and advanced 
education (junior college, college, or graduate school).8 
As we emphasized in the previous section, using of the appropriate measure of (labor) 
income uncertainty is crucial in our empirical analysis.  Table 1 presents the variance of 
and the standard error of the logarithm of after tax non-asset household income.  The 
variance of the after tax total household non-capital income is higher for households whose 
heads are employed in medium sized (entities that employ 30 or more but less than 500 
persons) and large private entities (entities that employ 500 or more persons) than for those 
whose heads are public servants.  This is contradictory to common sense with regard to 
the stability of earnings for each of the three occupations.   
Zhou (2003) uses the variance of the level of household labor income as a measure for 
labor income uncertainty for the regression of household consumption, and finds that the 
                                                  
8 Zhou (2003) does not consider a cohort effect in grouping households since she uses only the 1996 
wave. 
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coefficient of this risk measure is negative and statistically significant, and thereby claims 
that precautionary saving motives exist in Japan.  Her finding may be due to the fact that 
her income risk measure does not appropriately reflect the actual household labor income 
uncertainty. 
    The variance of the logarithm of total non-asset household income is larger for those 
employed in large and medium sized private entities than public servants.  The standard 
intertemporal optimization model on consumption assumes that shocks (persistent or 
transitory) are specified as multiplicative shocks to the predictable component of labor 
income and hence they enter additively in the equation for the logarithm of the labor 
income process (see Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes [1995], Carroll [1992, 1997], Gourinchas 
and Parker [2002]).   
    In this paper, following Carroll and Samwick ([1997], [1998]), we employ the 
logarithm of the variance of the logarithm of non-asset income, what Carroll and Samwick 
(1997, 1998) call LVARLY, as a measure for labor income uncertainty.  In calculating 
LVARLY for the groups of households considered, groups with less than ten households are 
dropped for fear of inaccurate estimates of variances for these groups. 
We employ an indicator (dummy) variable that takes the value of 1 if a respondent 
answers that the head of her household is healthy as an additional measure for household 
income risk.  This variable is meant to capture the risk that a household will go through a 
period of little or no income.  A household head with health related problems is more 
likely to leave his job and to lose income or is forced to take a sick leave and to go through 
a period of a substantial fall in his income than a healthy household head is.9 
                                                  
9 Ideally if the data collected information on previous occupations of a household head who is currently 
not working, we would be able to estimate the job loss risk in addition to earning uncertainty of the 
employed worker.   
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3.3. Questions on precautionary saving motives 
    The SFACH surveys not only amounts of total financial assets held and total debts 
owed but also collects information on at least 12 saving motives such as “for one’s 
children’s educational expenses” and “for living expenses during retirement” in the four 
waves used for our analysis.10  Two of the motives are consistent with precautionary 
saving motives in a broader definition.  The two such motives are “for illness, disasters, 
and other foreseen expenditures” and “no specific motive but for peace of mind” (hereafter 
“the peace of mind motive”).  While the former is the precautionary saving motive for 
unexpected expenses and is not the focus of this paper, the latter is the most consistent with 
the theoretical concept of precautionary saving for income uncertainty.  Since this is the 
only saving motive for unspecified expenses at present and in the future, any household that 
has precautionary wealth for income uncertainty should choose “the peace of mind motive” 
as one of its saving motives.  “The peace of mind motive” is not listed as one of the 
surveyed borrowing motives, as households are unlikely to borrow for no specific expenses.   
Use of saving for the peace of mind motive rather than a more broad measure for 
saving such as total wealth is important.  Since saving for the peace of mind motive does 
not include saving for life cycle related motives, which are dealt with separately in at least 
9 listed motives in the SFACH, the effect of the measure of income uncertainty on saving 
for the peace of mind motive should be stronger than that on other traditionally used 
                                                  
10 The 12 saving motives surveyed in all four waves of the SFACH are, (1) for living expenses during 
retirement, (2) for illness, disasters, and other unforeseen expenditures, (3) for one’s children’s 
educational expenses, (4) for one’s children’s marriage expenses, (5) for the acquisition (including 
rebuilding and replacement purchase) of owner-occupied housing (including land), (6) for purchase of 
consumer durables, (7) for leisure expenses, (8) for the payment of taxes, (9) for an independent business, 
(10) no specific motive but for peace of mind, (11) in order to leave a bequest, and (12) other. 
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dependent variables.  The empirical results using total financial wealth which give 
unfavorable results for the precautionary saving hypothesis do not necessarily reject the 
precautionary saving hypothesis if the results with saving for the peace of mind motive 
support the hypothesis.11 
    The survey questionnaire is structured such that a respondent is first asked to answer 
whether her household has currently savings for each motive, and then the household’s 
current financial wealth for that motive, the household’s wealth target for that motive, and 
the number of years the household thinks it will need to meet that target.12 
 
3.4. The empirical model 
The main empirical model in this study is the same as the model analyzed by Lusardi 
(1998), Carroll and Samwick (1997, 1998), and Murata (2003) in structure, but the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of precautionary wealth, PEACE. 
 
itititityithitit uXPHLVARLYPEACE +++++= βαααα σ lnln 0  
itH  is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent answers that the 
household head is healthy and zero otherwise (hereafter “the health dummy”).  itP  is the 
estimated after-tax permanent income excluding returns on assets.  itX  contains age and 
                                                  
11 Specifying a functional form of a utility function, Parker and Preston (2002) decompose consumption 
growth into the negative effect of precautionary saving and the rest, and regresses the estimated negative 
effect of precautionary saving on consumption on income uncertainty. 
12 In the 1998 and 2000 waves of the SFACH, respondents are asked to report the proportion of the 
current financial wealth for the peace of mind motive to total financial wealth rather than the current 
financial wealth for that motive itself.  Thus, in these two waves, the current financial wealth for the 
peace of mind motive is obtained by multiplying this proportion by the total financial wealth for each 
household. 
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other demographic variables to control for the predictable life cycle effects on wealth.  
Variables included in itX  are the age of the household head, the square of the age of the 
head, the age of the head in 1990 as a cohort effect, the number of children in the household, 
and time dummy variables. 13  itu  is an error term.  The measure for income uncertainty, 
itLVARLY , is supposed to be measured with an error. 
Two variables are tested for PEACE, the household’s current financial wealth for the 
peace of mind motive, PEACE_CURRENT and the household’s wealth target for this 
motive, PEACE_TARGET.  For households that answer they do not have savings for the 
peace of mind motive, missing values for PEACE_CURRENT and PEACE_TARGET are 
replaced with the value zero, but households that answer they have savings for the peace of 
mind motive and leave PEACE_CURRENT or PEACE_TARGET unanswered are dropped 
from the sample when the corresponding variable is used as a dependent variable.  Such a 
treatment of missing values leaves households without the precautionary saving motive 
overrepresented in the sample.  However, as long as the underlying structural model 
characterizing the precautionary saving behavior is unaltered no matter whether a 
dependent variable is positive or zero, which is our model specification described in the 
next subsection, and households are not dropped non-randomly, such overrepresentation of 
households with a dependent variable being zero does not bias the estimates. 
 
3.5. Endogeneity of the measure for income risk and use of instrumental variables 
Endogeneity of the measure for income risk LVARLY would bias its estimated 
coefficient.  The error in the measure for labor income risk LVARLY could be large since 
it is not a directly observable variable but an estimated one.   
                                                  
13 We followed Carroll and Samwick (1997, 1998) in selecting variables included in itX . 
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Even more serious is likely the reverse causality from the individual’s saving behavior 
to her income risk through her risk averseness that would result in underestimating the 
coefficient of LVARLY if an OLS regression were run.  Risk-averse individuals save more 
precautionary wealth for income risks, and are also likely to choose a more stable 
occupation such as the public service or larger companies.  On the other hand, risk loving 
individuals save less precautionary wealth, and are likely to choose unstable occupations 
such as self-employment or smaller venture companies where chances and opportunities 
may be plenty but risks are higher.  Thus, (labor) income uncertainty and saving can be 
negatively related through an individual’s risk-averseness.   
    In order to correct the bias on the estimate of the coefficient of LVARLY, we estimate 
the equation using an instrumental variable regression.  As instrumental variables, we use 
exogenous variables in the equation to be estimated (the health dummy H, and the variables 
included in X), dummy variables for regions (regional dummies), dummy variables for city 
size (city size dummies), dummy variables for educational attainment (education dummies, 
the base group being advanced degree holders), the square of the age of the head in 1990 
(the square of the cohort effect), age interacted with education dummies, age squared 
interacted with education dummies, age interacted with a health dummy, age squared 
interacted with a health dummy, a cohort effect interacted with education dummies, and a 
cohort effect squared interacted with education dummies.  We do not include dummy 
variables indicating the occupation of the household head, since the occupation of the 
household head is likely correlated with savings through risk averseness of family members 
in a household.   
    Indeed estimating the equation with instrumental variables is equivalent to a two-step 
estimation by running an OLS regression with predicted values of independent variables 
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obtained through regressing them on instrumental variables.  Thus, the value of itPln  
predicted by instrumental variables is used in running the regression for precautionary 
saving.  This is equivalent to saying that the permanent non-asset income estimated using 
age, education, the health condition, and the cohort effect of the household head, is used as 
an independent variable. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analysis 
    Figure 1 displays the profiles of gross financial wealth, net financial wealth (gross 
financial wealth less debts), current financial wealth for the peace of mind motive and the 
share of current financial wealth for the peace of mind motive within gross financial wealth 
by the age group of the household head controlling for the birth year of the household head.  
As the household head ages, gross and net financial wealth increase monotonically, 
implying that households are accumulating financial wealth for their retirement as the life 
cycle hypothesis suggests.  The savings for the peace of mind motive, on the other hand, 
do not increase as the household head ages.   
As a result, the share of precautionary wealth within the household financial wealth 
remains high and ranges from 20 percent to 30 percent before 55, but declines to about 15 
percent afterward.  This feature of the age profile of our direct measure for precautionary 
wealth is consistent with the finding by Cagetti (2003), who simulates the share of liquid 
wealth attributable to a buffer against income uncertainty based on the estimates of 
preference parameters of a dynamic optimizing household using the wealth data on 
American households in the Survey of Consumer Finances.14 
                                                  
14 Parker and Gourinchas (2002) and Abe and Yamada (2005) estimate preference parameters using 
consumption data on American and Japanese households respectively and conduct a similar simulation 
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    Descriptive statistics of dependent variables and independent variables are presented 
in Table 2.  In the following analysis, for the baseline regressions, households with a head 
aged 50 or younger are selected in the sample as in Carroll and Samwick (1997, 1998).  
This is intended to exclude from the sample life cycle savers who primarily save for their 
retirement. 
 
4.2. Estimation results using general measures for financial wealth 
    Rows one and two of Table 3 show the regression results with financial wealth used as 
a dependent variable.  The dependent variables are gross financial wealth in the first row 
and net financial wealth in the second row.  Net financial wealth used in the second row is 
found by subtracting the balance of all debts but housing loans from gross financial wealth.  
This is because the same amount of real assets appears in the household’s balance sheet 
when it holds housing loans, and the net value of debts for housing loans is approximately 
zero.15, 16   
    Regardless of the dependent variable used, estimated coefficients of income 
uncertainty and the health dummy are not statistically significant.  The results with 
measures of income and health uncertainty are not consistent with the Carroll and 
                                                                                                                                                        
exercise to Caggeti’s one.  They find that the share of precautionary wealth starts to decline a little 
earlier in the mid 40’s than in our sample. 
15 In the SFAHC, respondents are asked first whether they are borrowing and then they are asked the 
amount of debts they owe.  In order to keep the sample size large enough, we replace missing values 
for the amount of debts with zero even if respondents answer that they are borrowing.  We apply the 
same principle to housing loans held by households.   
16 In the 1998 and 200 waves of the SFACH, respondents are asked to report the proportion of housing 
loans borrowed to total debts owed rather than the amount of housing loans itself.  Thus, in these two 
waves, housing loans borrowed is obtained by multiplying the proportion by total debts owed for each 
household. 
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Samwick’s results for American households but are consistent with the results for Japanese 
households found by Murata (2003). 
 
4.3. Estimation results with self-reported financial wealth and wealth target 
Dependent variables used in rows three and four are self-reported precautionary 
wealth and the wealth target for a precautionary motive. 
Since many households in the sample are not saving for the peace of mind motive, and 
hence, variables PEACE_CURRENT and PEACE_TARGET take on zero for many 
households, treating an observed dependent variable as a continuous variable is likely to 
lead to biased estimates.  Thus, we estimate a Tobit model with instrumental variables 
assuming that the model is censored at zero for the dependent variable.  We use predicted 
values for the independent variables from the first stage OLS regression in the maximum 
likelihood estimation of a second-stage Tobit model.17  Neither the estimated coefficient of 
income uncertainty (LVARLY) nor that of the health dummy is statistically significant 
when the self-reported current precautionary wealth is used as the dependent variable. 
The coefficient of LVARLY is positive and statistically significant at the five percent 
level when the self-reported target for precautionary wealth is used.  Our coefficient 
estimate implies that an increase in LVARLY by one percent would increase the target 
precautionary wealth by 0.68 percent.  This means that, for instance, the self-employed, 
the riskiest occupation, target 28 percent more of precautionary wealth than public servants, 
                                                  
17 We estimate a Tobit model with the two-step estimation method described in Amemiya (1979) and 
Smith and Blundell (1986).  In the second step Tobit regression, the dependent variable is regressed on 
values of endogenous variables predicted by instrumental variables as well as on estimated residuals for 
endogenous variables obtained from the first step OLS regressions.  Correction of biases in standard 
errors of parameter estimates resulting from the first stage OLS regressions for endogenous variables 
follows the way suggested by Smith and Blundell (1986). 
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the safest occupation. 
The coefficient of the health dummy is negative and statistically significant at the one 
percent level for the regression with the target as the dependent variable.  The effect of the 
health dummy on the wealth target is large.  The estimated coefficient of -0.84 means that 
a household with an unhealthy head targets 2.3 times as much precautionary wealth as a 
household with a healthy head does.  As saving for unexpected medical expenditures is 
surveyed as a separate saving motive in the SFACH, households with an unhealthy head 
attempt to insure against a large income loss caused by job loss or sick leave. 
Our finding is consistent with the recent findings on precautionary saving by American 
households.  Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) find that the target for precautionary wealth 
surveyed in the Survey of Consumer Finances is correlated to various measures for 
uncertainty.  Parker and Preston (2002), on the other hand find that the coefficient of the 
measure for income uncertainty is not statistically significant in the regression for the 
estimated flow of precautionary saving.  Like American households, Japanese households 
follow the buffer stock saving behavior.  What is relevant is the target for wealth not the 
current amount of wealth itself. 
Our point estimate of the coefficient of LVARLY on the self-reported target wealth of 
Japanese households is about twice as large as the coefficient of the same variable on gross 
financial wealth for American households found by Carroll and Samwick (1997) (their 
point estimate is 0.368), suggesting that our use of the self-reported target is more 
appropriate in capturing the precautionary saving motive of households. 
 
4.4. Endogenous income uncertainty and use of a censored regression 
    Table 4 compares the baseline result obtained using a two-stage Tobit model with 
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instrumental variables for non-asset income and the measure for income uncertainty 
LVARLY with results obtained using the OLS, a Tobit model without instrumental variables, 
a two-stage Tobit model with instrumental variables for non-asset income only, and the two 
stage least square (2SLS). 
As it turns out, the coefficient of LVARLY is always negative and statistically 
significant when LVARLY is not instrumented (OLS, Tobit, two-stage Tobit when 
instrumental variables for non-asset income only are used), suggesting that the use of 
instrumental variables for LVARLY is crucial in identifying the effect of income risk on the 
target for precautionary wealth with the opposite effect through differences in households’ 
risk averseness.   
When censoring at zero for the dependent variable is not taken into account but 
LVARLY is instrumented, the coefficient of LVARLY is indistinguishable from zero, 
suggesting that the use of a censored regression model (Tobit) is essential. 
 
4.5. Robustness checks 
    Table 5 presents the robustness checks of our findings with the self-reported target for 
precautionary financial wealth as the dependent variable by estimating regressions with 
different samples of households. 
 
Age and the buffer stock saving behavior: the US-Japan comparison 
    We change age groups included in the baseline sample and see if our findings still hold.  
The coefficient of LVARLY remains positive and statistically significant for the sample of 
households with a head aged 45 or younger.  In contrast, the coefficient of LVARLY is no 
longer statistically significant when households with a head older than 50 are included in 
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the sample.  The coefficient of the health dummy remains negative but is no longer 
statistically significant for the sample of households with a head aged 45 or younger.  The 
coefficient of the health dummy is not statistically significant for the sample including 
households with an older head.18 
    Our findings that income uncertainty does not influence the target for precautionary 
wealth suggest that our measures for income uncertainty, LVARLY and the health dummy, 
may not capture the risks faced by older households.  Examples of such risks include the 
longevity risk.  Though the retirement motive for saving is surveyed as a separate saving 
motive, respondents may choose the peace of mind motive rather than the retirement 
motive for vague anxieties over their longevity. 
Using the US – Japan survey conducted in 1996 by the IPTP whose questionnaire is 
similar to the SFACH, Horioka et al (2000) find that Japanese households are found to be 
not strongly motivated for leaving behind bequests and that 70 percent answer “I will not 
make any particular efforts to leave behind a bequest but will leave to my child or children 
whatever assets happen to be left over.”  They, however, find that the proportion of 
households that have received bequests in the past and/or that expect to receive them in the 
future is 40 percent.  They further show that the average bequest of households which 
received bequests in the past is huge (54,110,000 yen or 475,609 dollars (exchanged at the 
rate at the end of November 1996)) or 9.6 times the average annual household disposable 
income.)   
They show that American households in contrast have a stronger willingness to leave 
                                                  
18 The sample of households with a head aged 40 or younger was also examined.  Estimates are 
implausible and one of the standard errors for coefficients estimated according to Smith and Blundell 
(1986)’s method was an imaginary number.  These may be caused by lack of an adequate sample size 
(882 households).   
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behind bequests but end up leaving smaller bequests (46 percent of American households 
answer “I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest” and the average bequest left is 
74,756 dollars.).  Accidental bequests left behind by American households are thus small.   
It may be due to this difference in preference toward the longevity risk between 
American and Japanese households that the evidence by Carroll and Samwick (2002) and 
our finding in the sample including older households are not consistent with each other 
(Carroll and Samwick find that the coefficient of LVARLY remains statistically significant 
even in the sample including older households.). 
 
Excluding the self-employed 
    The coefficient of LVARLY is estimated to be larger and that of the health dummy is 
estimated to be smaller for the sample excluding self-employed households (which includes 
households in agriculture or in forestry) than for the baseline sample.  This may suggest 
that staying healthy is particularly important for the self-employed, particularly agricultural 
workers whose work includes more manual labor than that of salaried workers.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Using the Survey on the Financial Asset Choice of Households (SFACH) conducted 
by the Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy of the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications of the Government of Japan (the present Japan Post Corporation), we 
analyzed the relationship between income uncertainty and precautionary wealth. 
What makes the SFACH unique is the survey on the household’s current financial 
wealth and the wealth target for at least twelve saving motives in addition to the survey on 
total financial assets, borrowing, and various financial and demographic variables.  We 
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consider saving “for peace of mind but not for specific reasons” as (self-reported) 
precautionary saving against income uncertainty. 
Our main findings are: 1. Measures of income uncertainty have a positive influence on 
the self-reported target for precautionary wealth but not on precautionary wealth itself. 2. 
The positive influence of income uncertainty on the self-reported target for precautionary 
wealth vanishes for the sample including older households with a head aged 51 or older.  
These findings suggest that Japanese households save against income uncertainty until 
around when the head is aged 50 and then save against other risks such as the longevity 
risk.   
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Table 1 The measure for uncertainty of non-asset income by occupation 
 
Occupation 
The logarithm of the 
variance of the 
logarithm 
The standard error 
Private entity, less than 30 employees 0.5120 313.2
Private entity, 30 or more but less than 500 employees 0.4771 404.6
Private entity, more than 500 employees 0.4959 398.9
Public service 0.4365 415.0
Self-employment 0.7146 826.5
N 3903 3903
 
A unit of non-asset income is 10,000 yen 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Continuous variables 
 
  N Mean Std MIN MAX 
The current wealth for the PM motive 2983 170.2 479.2 0 8100
The wealth target for the PM motive 2825 242.6 771.0 0 12000
Gross financial wealth 3351 1120.7 1369.7 1 21100
Net financial wealth 3351 993.3 1555.3 -26013 21100
After tax non-asset income 3903 765.2 439.8 4 7700
LVARLY 2983 -1.529 0.5485 -2.946 0.080
Age of the household head in the survey year 3903 45.5 8.27 30 59
Age of the household head in 1990 3903 38.6 8.7 20 55
Number of children 3903 1.70 0.97 0 7
 
Note:  
1. Amounts are in 10,000 yen. 
2. In calculating summary statistics for the current wealth for the peace of mind (PM) motive and 
the wealth target for the peace of mind motive, respondents who reported they have savings for the 
peace of mind motive but do not give the amount are excluded. 
3. LVARLY is the logarithm of the variance of the logarithm of non-asset household income. 
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Binary variables 
 
    Frequency Proportion
Region Hokkaido and Tohoku 444 11.35
 Kanto 1260 32.28
 Chubu and Kinki 1267 32.46
 Chugoku and Shikoku 424 10.86
 Kyushu 509 13.04
  Total 3903  
City size Tokyo 23 boroughs 314 8.05
 11 large cities 669 17.14
 Cities of population over 150,000 1195 30.62
 Cities of population over 50,000 726 18.60
 Cities of population below 50,000 244 6.25
 Counties (rural) 755 19.34
  Total 3903  
Occupation of the head Private entities, less than 30 employees 540 13.84
 Private entities, less than 500 employees 1031 26.42
 Private entities, 500 or more employees 1052 26.95
 Public service 479 12.27
 Agriculture, forestry, and self-employment 801 20.52
  Total 3903  
Junior high school 505 12.94Educational attainment 
of the head High school 1897 48.60
 Advanced education 1501 38.46
 Total 3903  
Healthy 3729 95.54Health condition of 
the household head Sick 174 4.46
  Total 3903  
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Table 3. Estimation results 
 
  Dependent variable 
 Financial wealth Peace of mind motive 
  
Gross Net 
Current 
wealth 
Target wealth 
1.568*** 2.482***  4.552*** 5.150*** LNINCOME (log of 
non-asset income)   (0.188) (0.533) (0.291) (0.327) 
-0.220 -0.100    0.291 0.683** 
LNVARLY 
(0.168) (0.476) (0.249) (0.268) 
  0.051 -0.021   -0.253     -0.839*** 
Health dummy 
(0.138) (0.389) (0.203) (0.245) 
-2.179***  -3.994*** -4.035***     -3.092*** 
Head age 
(0.384) (1.087) (0.585) (0.668) 
-0.0032*** -0.0048** 0.0053***     0.0101*** 
Head age squared 
(0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
2.447*** 4.376*** 3.430*** 2.021*** 
Head age in 1990 
(0.432) (1.221) (0.655) (0.749) 
  0.009    -0.132* -0.136*** -0.274*** 
The number of children 
(0.026) (0.072) (0.039) (0.046) 
4.655*** 8.434*** 8.174*** 5.820*** 
Year dummy for 1996 
(0.840) (2.377) (1.271) (1.453) 
9.932*** 17.456*** 14.990*** 10.561*** 
Year dummy for 1998 
(1.742) (4.927) (2.641) (3.018) 
14.838*** 25.986*** 21.032*** 14.321*** 
Year dummy for 2000 
(2.599) (7.353) (3.942) (4.507) 
     1.174*** 1.507*** The predicted residual 
for LNINCOME   (0.290) (0.327) 
  -0.562**    -0.960*** The predicted residual 
for LVARLY   (0.249) (0.268) 
N 2267 2267 2014 1902 
 
Note  
1. *, ** and *** show that a coefficient is statistically significant at 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively.   
2. LNVARLY is thea logarithm of the variance of the logarithm of non-asset household income. 
3. In the text, current wealth for the peace of mind motive and the target wealth for the peace of mind 
motive are sometimes abbreviated as PEACE_CURRENT and PEACE_TARGET respectively. 
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Table 4. Results of alternative econometric models for the target precautionary wealth 
 
  
Two-step Tobit 
(baseline from 
Table 3) 
OLS Tobit 
Two-step Tobit, 
LNVARLY is 
exogenous 
2SLS 
5.150*** 0.617***  1.777*** 5.118*** 1.747***logarithm of non-asset 
income       (0.327) (0.138) (0.425) (0.292) (0.521)
0.683** -0.261** -0.836** -0.494*** 0.066 
LVARLY 
(0.268) (0.133) (0.393) (0.076) (0.427)
   -0.839*** -0.171   -0.598 -0.748*** -0.231 
Health dummy 
(0.245) (0.382) (1.098) (0.219) (0.390)
   -3.092*** 0.918   0.119 -4.225*** -0.361 
Head age 
(0.668) (0.722) (2.285) (0.572) (1.066)
  0.0101*** 0.0035 0.0086 0.0087*** 0.0037* Head age squared 
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0060) (0.00120) (0.0022)
2.021*** -1.249   -0.960 3.291*** -0.021 
Head age in 1990 
(0.749) (0.885) (2.554) (0.640) (3.009)
-0.274*** -0.081 -0.217 -0.268*** -0.274 
The number of children 
(0.046) (0.071) (0.209) (0.041) (1.194)
5.820*** -1.569 0.831 8.341*** 0.556 
Year dummy for 1996 
(1.453) (1.7847) (5.1284) (1.238) (2.316)
10.561*** -4.381 -1.7040 15.623*** 0.639 
Year dummy for 1998 
(3.018) (3.557) (10.227) (2.585) (4.813)
14.321*** -6.864 -3.607 21.967*** 0.519 
Year dummy for 2000 
(4.507) (5.327) (15.317) (3.854) (18.117)
1.507***   1.505***  The predicted residual 
for LNINCOME (0.327)  (0.292) 
   -0.960***     The predicted residual 
for LVARLY (0.268)   
N 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902
 
Note  
1. *, ** and *** show that a coefficient is statistically significant at 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively.   
2. LNVARLY is the logarithm of the variance of the logarithm of non-asset household income. 
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Table 5. Robustness checks 
 
  
45 or younger 50 or younger
(baseline from 
Table 3) 
55 or younger 59 or younger Exclude 
agriculture, forestry 
and 
self-employment
0.803** 0.683**      1.090      0.054      0.956***
LVARLY 
(0.407) (0.268) (0.868) (0.645) (0.258)
-0.233    -0.839***      0.206      -0.054 -0.563**
Health dummy 
(0.423) (0.245) (0.248) (0.178) (0.248)
N 1363 1902 2403 2817 1597
 
Note  
1. *, ** and *** show that a coefficient is statistically significant at 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively.   
2. LVARLY is the logarithm of the variance of the logarithm of non-asset household income. 
 
 31
Figure 1-1 Age profile of gross financial wealth 
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Note: Each curve tracks households in the same cohort. 
 
 
Figure 1-2 Age profile of net financial wealth 
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Note: Each curve tracks households in the same cohort. 
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Figure 1-3 Age profile of financial wealth for the peace of mind motive 
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Note:  
1. Each colored curve tracks households in the same cohort. 
2. Households that save for the peace of mind motive but do not report current financial 
wealth accumulated for the peace of mind motive are assumed to have the average for 
households who report current financial wealth for the peace of mind motive. 
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Figure 1-4 Age profile of the share of financial wealth for the peace of mind motive 
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Note:  
1. Each colored curve tracks households in the same cohort. 
2. Households that save for the peace of mind motive but do not report current financial 
wealth accumulated for the peace of mind motive are assumed to have the average for 
households who report current financial wealth for the peace of mind motive. 
3. The share is taken against gross financial wealth. 
